Ertimur, Yonca & Ferri, Fabrizio & Maber, David A., 2012. Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. " On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. " Do boards pay attention when institutional investor activists "just vote no"?," Del Guercio, Diane & Seery, Laura & Woidtke, Tracie, 2008. Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. " Interim News and the Role of Proxy Voting Advice," " The market reaction to corporate governance regulation," 
& Ormazabal, Gaizka & Taylor, Daniel J., 2011. " The Vote is cast: The effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value,"
Vicente Cunat & Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, 2010. " The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value,"ġ6574, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Vicente Cuñat & Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, 2010. Our findings contribute to the literature on shareholder voting and the related policy debate. Our findings suggest that, rather than identifying and promoting superior compensation practices, PAs' key economic role is processing a substantial amount of executive pay information on behalf of institutional investors, hence reducing their cost of making informed voting decisions. However, we find no market reaction to the announcement of such changes, even when material enough to result in a favorable recommendation and vote the following year. More than half of the firms respond to the adverse shareholder vote triggered by a negative recommendation by engaging with investors and making changes to their compensation plan. PAs’ recommendations are the key determinant of voting outcome but the sensitivity of shareholder votes to these recommendations varies with the institutional ownership structure, and the rationale behind the recommendation, suggesting that at least some shareholders do not blindly follow these recommendations. PAs are more likely to issue an Against recommendation at firms with poor performance and higher levels of CEO pay and do not appear to follow a “one‐size‐fits‐all” approach. This move will make our proxy one that provides stable profitability to those depositing the money that makes the overall system function.We investigate the economic role of proxy advisors (PAs) in the context of mandatory “say on pay” votes, a novel and complex item requiring significant firm‐specific analysis. 
And it’s more favorable to users as well, who get a constant and stable APR (currently 2.45%). This makes it fairer for the BPs who will pay less if the proxy size shrinks.
In other words, the rewards will reflect the proxy size. We’ll multiply that vote weight by the latest EOS inflation numbers to determine how much extra EOS each BP that our proxy votes for will receive.
The minimum reward was 7 EOS, but we’re going to set the reward to 85% of the daily payment a BP gets, thanks to our proxy.Įach EOS account has a “vote weight” representing that account’s proportion of voting power for the entire system. Now we’re changing the rules for our EOS proxy so that participants can continuously get a stable reward APR of around 2.3%.īlock producers were previously committing to a fixed reward that didn’t reflect any fluctuation in the size of the proxy. And stable passive income is twice as good.
0 kommentar(er)
